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I. 
Some of the most memorable events of the twentieth century took 
place as a result of conflict. Out of the numerous conflict·s staged 
during this period, only one was resolved not on a common everyday piece 
of writing paper. The proponents of the conflict--E. V. Huntington, 
Oswald Veblen, Bertrand Russell, A. N. Whitehead, and David Hilbert--did 
not use weapons, but they used basic mathematical structure to wage the 
most extensive and critical investigation into the foundations of 
mathematics. As a result three schools of thought which are of special 
prominence and interest were brought to light. These are the postulational 
school, the logical school, and the formalist school. 
The postulational school is led by Professors E. V. Huntington and 
Oswald Veblen. The specific aim of the school is to establish satis-
factory set s of postulates for various branches of mathematics. 
The logical school centers around Bertrand Russell and Professor 
A. N. Whitehead, and their three-volume treatise, Principia Mathematica . 
The members of this school are interest ed in the explicit formulation of 
symbolic logic as a foundation for mathematics. 
The formalist school i s led by David Hilbert of the University of 
Gottingen, an eminent mathematician who near the beginning of the century 
would have been classed as a postulationist. The formalist are attempting 




The reasoning underlying the program of the postulational school 
is simple and amounts to this. Any branch of mathematics must have a 
starting point somewhere. The postulates as employed, appear in there 
in perfect light as systems of principles underlying and supporting 
definite bodies of thought, and so they serve as a model, as an ideal 
prototype, for the inspiration, the guidance and the criticism of every 
rational enterprise. 2 Not all of the propositions can be proved and 
neither can all of its technical terms be defined. In order to com-
pletely prove all the propositions, the mathematician must have assumed 
certain propositions unconsciously and used certain terms glibly without 
realizing that they were undefined, or else he has been guilty of a 
"vicious circle" error. 
To proceed rationally in the deve~opment of a mathematical 
discipline, it is desirable to make the unproved properties (postulates 
and theorems ) and undefined terms as explicit as possible. Then by 
logical reasoning, it is possible to defin~ the concepts of the subject 
in terms of the undefined concepts and deduce further propositions from 
the unproved propositions. To avoid contradictions it is necessary to 
adopt a definite restricted set of postulates and a definite restricted 
lE. Russell Stabler, "An Interpretation and Comparison of Three 
Schools of Thought in the Foundations of Mathematics, 11 Mathematics Teacher, 
28 (1962) . 
2cassius J. Keyser, Mathematical Philosophy (New York: E. P. Dutton 
and Company, 1922) . 
3 
number of undefined terms.3 
The methodology is that of generalization ·by suppression of certain 
postulates defining a given system. The system defined by the curtailed 
set of postulates is then developed. At this stage, the undefined terms 
and the postulates have some concrete or psychological significance to 
the mind. For example, the postulates may make concrete statements about 
such undefined terms as points, lines, or numbers.4 However, if the 
undefined terms are as they are called, undefined, it must be possible 
to abstract all previous connotations from them, and to treat them as 
mere symbols, devoid of any special significance other than what may be 
implied about them in the statement of postulates, It must also be 
possible to reinterpret these symbols in new ways. If some new concret e 
interpretation can be found--which itself appeals to the judgement as 
being self-consistent--then it is claimed that the postulates are logi-
cally consistent. 
As an illustration consider the undefined class of elements called 
"points"; an undefined sub-class of points called "lines''; and an unde-
fined number associated with two points of a line, called ulengths." 
Assume a knowledge of certain ideas of arit hmetic and general language. 
A point, P, is said to be on a line, 1. Two lines are said to intersect 
if there is a point which belongs to both of them. With these preliminary 
assumptions, the following postulates are proposed in geometry. 
1. Two distinct "lines" intersect in two and only two distinct 
"points." 
3
stabler, op. cit. 
4E. T. Bell, The Development of Mathematics (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1945). 
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2. Through the two intersection 11 points 11 of two 11 lines 11 pass an 
infinite number of 11 lines.'' 
3. The 11 distance 11 between two intersecting 11 points 11 of two 
11 lines 11 is the same along all of the 11 lines 11 which pass 
through the two 11 points. 11 
4. Every 11 line'1 has a finite 11 length11 which is equal to the 
11 length11 of every other 11 line. 11 
5. Through two 11 points 11 which are not intersection 11 points 11 of 
two 11 lines 11 there passes one and only one 11 line. 11 
These postulates are not altogether easy to comprehend, and a 
person thoroughly imbued with the traditional view of mathematics would 
not hesitate to deny their validity, even if reminded that 11 point, 11 
11 line, 11 and 11 length 11 are undefined terms. However, it will be simpler 
to remember the abstractness of the original terms used in the postu-
lates, and to reinterpret these words directly. The object is to find 
some concrete interpretation which will satisfy all five postulates, 
and it is easy to do this. All that is necessary is to interpret the 
class of 11 points 11 as the class of 11 points on the surface of a fixed 
sphere of three dimemsion11 ; 11 length11 as the concept of 11 arc length11 or 
11 distance 11 as measured along a great circle of the sphere. The postu-
lates now read as follows: 
1. Two distinct spheres intersect in two and only two distinct 
points of the sphere. 
2. Through the two intersection points of two spheres there pass 
an infinite number of circles. 
3. The distance between the two intersection points of two 
spheres is the same along all of the circles which pass 
through the two points. 
4. Every circle has a finite length which is equal to the length 
of every other great circle. 
5. Through two points o.f the sphere which are not intersection 
points of two great circles there passes one and only one 
circle. 
These statements are all quickly judged to be true because of proven 
theories of Euclidean geometry of the sphere. Furthermore, since 
Euclidean geometry is self-consistent, it is possible to state that the 
5 
original five postulates are consistent. 
When a tentative list of postulates has been shown to be a con-
sistent set, it is perfectly conceivable that certain postulates of the 
set are logically deducible from others of the set. Such postulates 
are superfluous, or redundant. There is no inherent logical fallacy in 
using a redundant consistent set of postulates, but for at least two 
reasons it is often desirable that the postulates be free of redundance 
or independent. First, an independent set of postulates renders the 
structure of the subject more aesthetically pleasing since no statement 
is included as a postulate which might be deduced as a theorem. Second, 
if the redundant postulates are removed, it is possible to go back to 
any concrete interpretation used in establishing consistency and have 
fewer postulates to judge true or false than previously. Thus the 
soundness of the structure of the subject is made to depend more on 
abstract logical relations, and less on concrete interpretation judge-
ments. 
Another characteristic which a consistent set of postulates may 
or may not possess is that of categoricalness. A set is categorical if 
it forms the foundation for essentially only one branch of mathematics, 
while a set is non-categorical if it can serve as a foundation for two 
or more essentially different branches of mathematics. It would hardly 
be possible here to give a satisfactory illustration of a categorical 
set of postulates, but it is not as difficult to cite an example of a 
non-categorical set. 6 
Start with an undefined class, K, or elements which may be 
6 
designated as A, B, C ••• Suppose that an undefined operation or relation-
ship between any two elements of the class defines a third element which 
may or may not belong to the class. The element obtained by operating 
on A and B is designated as A # B. Now the following postulates are 
agreed upon: 
1. If A and B are elements of the class K, A # B belongs to K. 
2. If A, B, C belong to K, then (A# B) # C =A# (B #C ) . 
3. There exists a unique element X of K such that X# X= X. 
4. For any element A of K there exists a unique element A1 of 
K such that A# AI =X. 
Since there are many concrete systems having only a finite number of 
elements, which satisfy the postulates it is possible to make the 
following replacements. One permutation, A, replaces x by y and y by x; 
the other permutation, B, replaces x by itself andy by itself. A# B 
will be interpretated as the result of performing permutation A and 
following it by permutation B. 
When interpreting the postulates in accordance with these agree-
ments, the first postulate requires that the result of performing any 
two permutations ·of the class successively is a permutation belonging to 
the class. By trying all the possibilities it is easy to see that this 
postulate is satisfied. Thus, since A replaces x by y and B replaces y 
by itself, A# B replaces x by y and in the same way it replaces y by x; 
in other words, A # B is the element A which is known to belong to the 
class. Similarly, A # A= B, B #A= A, and B # B =B. By the same 
kind of observations the second postulate is satisfied. 
The third postulate requires that a unique "identical" element, 
X, exists such that X # X = X. The element B meets this requirement 
inasmuch as B # B = B; furthermore, it is the only element of K which 
meets the requirement, as A does not. 
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The fourth postulate requires the existence of unique "inverse'' 
elements, A1 and B1 , for both A and B. Now B is the identical element 
and is called A # A = B, B # B = B; furthermore, if operations are made 
on A by B, or on B by A, the identical element is not obtained. Thus, 
there is a unique inverse for each element of the class--namely, the 
element itself--and the postulate is satisfied. 
This is not judged as a concrete class of two elements, with the 
accompanying interpretation of the undefined operation, that satisfies 
all four of our postulates. Since some systems which satisfy the postu-
lates may contain an infinite number of elements, and this system has 
only two elements, a one-to-one correspondence cannot be set up. Hence 
the four postulates are non-categorical; they are not sufficient to 
determine a distinctive mathematical science. 
It is not inferred that a set of postulates is not useful if non-
categorical. On the contrary there are often advantages in having a 
non-categorical set. For in this way it is possible to develop parts 
of a number of separate branches of mathematics at the same time. Thus, 
in any system which satisfies the postulates for a group, the theorem 
which can be deduced from these postulates will be true, regardless of 
whether or not the systems can be put one-to-one correspondence with 
each other. 
The first concern of the school is to establish consistent sets 
of postulates for various mathematical sciences. It is usually desirable 
that a set of postulates be independent, and sometimes a set is desired 
to be categorical, sometimes non-categorical. It is notable that in 
establishing consistency, independence, and categoricalness, the proofs 
depend first, on the abstract nature of the postulates when the undefined 
terms are treated as abstract symbols; second, on the possibility of 
interpreting the undefined terms, and hence the postulates, in ·many 
concrete ways having psychological or intuitive significance; third, 
on a process of judging that these postulates are satisfied or not 
satisfied for a given concrete interpretation or system; and fourth, 
on an assuption that each of the concrete systems used is self-
consistent. 
8 
To summarize the characteristic features of mathematics from the 
postulational view point, mathematics is a collection of mathematical 
sciences whose subject matter may be considered either as abstract, or 
concrete in innumerable directions. Any mathematical science in com-
pleted form is a deductive structure of thought exhibiting a logical 
chain of reasoning from postulates to theorems, and a corresponding 
building up process from undefined terms to defined terms. The postu-
lates are not to be considered as self-evident truths, but rather as 
assumptions concerning fundamental properties which are made in the 
beginning for the purpose of getting started in the particular branch 
of mathematics under consideration. It is essential that the postulates 
be consistent, but absolute proofs of consistency do not seem to be 
possible. The theorems are not absolutely true, but rather are true at 
most in relation to the postulates and methods of deductive reasoning 
used in deriving them.? 
III. 
According to logicalism, mathematics is a branch of logic. Math-
ematical logic is deductive reasoning as it occurs in mathematics. 8 The 
7Ibid. 
8Bell, op. cit. 
9 
starting point is a set of undefined or "primitive ideas," and a group 
of unproved propositions of logic, whose choice is held to be more or less 
an arbitrary matter. A preliminary symbolism is adopted for most of the 
primitive ideas, and most of the primitive propositions are stated in 
complete symbolic form. 
The symbols are at first repellant; they tend to frighten but are 
not in fact difficult to master. Theoretically, the symbols are not 
essential but practically they are indispensible as instruments for 
economizing our intellectual energy.9 The reduction to symbols is 
supposed to show the point of application of mathematics, as it were the 
attachment by means of which it is plugged into its application.10 It 
is significant that the primitive ideas and corresponding symbols are 
not abstract in the sense that the undefined terms or symbols of a branch 
of mathematics can be considered to be abstract in the postulational 
school; on the contrary, symbols are used from the beginning to repre-
sent concrete logical ideas in concise and convenient form. 
Important among the primitive ideas are the following: elementary 
propositions, elementary propositional functions, assertion, negation, 
and disjunction. An elementary propostition (designated by p, q, r, etc.) 
is a statement of the form "this book is green"; an elementary propo-
sitional function is a statement with a variable or undetermined element 
such that when a definite meaning, or value, is assigned to the variable 
the resulting statement is an elementary proposition. For example, 11 x 
9cassius J. Keyser, Mathematical Philosophy (New York: E. P. Dutton 
and Company, 1922). 
lOLudwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics 
(Oxford: Alden and Mowbrary Ltd., 1967). 
10 
is a man" is a propositional function, because if we substitute 11this 
Mr. Brown" or "this dog" the result is an elementary proposition. A 
property, p, may be asserted to be true (written "!- p'') or it may be 
merely considered. The negative of a certain proposition, p, is the 
proposition "not p 11 or 11-'\J p." The distinction of two properties p and 
q if the property "p or 11 that is "either p is true or q is true," 
written 11 p\lq." 
The ideas of elementary proposition, negation, and disjunction 
make the all important definition, the definition implication. The 
statement "p implies <:a." written by 11 p.>q11 is defined to 1nean the same 
thing as 11...-v pyq" that is "either p is false or q is true, " or "if p 
is true, then q is true." 
The notion of implication is prominent in the statement of the 







Anything implied by a true elementary property is true. 
If, f1 , can be asserted to be true and we can assert that f}!fz, then we can assert f 2 is true . (pvp J>P (p or p implies p) 
q _:, (pvq) (q implies p or q ) 
(pl/q)_::, (qyp ) 
The primitive properties should be referred to as assertions of primitive 
propositional functions, for the letters p, q stand for variable or 
undetermined elementary propostions, and it is asserted that the state-
ments hold for every specific property which may be substituted for p, q. 
Some of the significent theorems in the theory of d·eduction which 




(p .:::>'"'-' p )..)'""'-" P "if p ~~lies not p, then p 
[p:> r )J>[(p .::> q )> (p ..:;, r )j "if q implies r, 
q, p implies r. 
pVrvp "p is true or p is false" 
if false " 
then ifl p implies 
4. P~ ·-v ( '""" p ) "p implies that not p is false '' 
5. (p .::> q ) ,:) (,..; q.:>.-vp ) "if p implies q,. then not q implies 
not p" 
All of these theorems are seen to correspond to methods of 
ll 
deductive reasoning which are usually taken for granted. There is not 
quarrel with the postulational view that the method and structure of 
mathematics are deductive, but in the postulational school the nature 
of deductive reasoning remains largely unanalyzed, while in the logical 
school the deductive methods and concepts are themselves developed in 
great detail from a foundation of undefined terms and unproved properties 
of logic. Furthermore, instead of viewing the subject matter of mathe-
matics as wholly abstract, the logical school looks upon mathematical 
subject matter as consisting of any concepts which may be ultimately 
traced back and defined in terms of the undefined concepts of logic. 
Mathematics is not now a collection of deductive sciences, each with its 
own foundation, but a single unified deductive science with a single 
foundation in logic. 
Symbolic logic has established the thesis that all existing mathe-
matics (and presumable all potential mathematics ) is literally a logical 
outgrowth of a few primitive ideas, and a few primitive propositions of 
logic.11 Unrestricted in subject matter, logic analyzes its propositions 
as referring to classes and attributes. 12 No relationship can be defined 
without a logical frame and any apparent disharmony in the description 
of experiences can be eliminated only by an appropriate widening of the 
11Keyser, op. cit. 
12Arthur Pap, "Mathematics, Abstract Entities, and Modern Semantics, " 
Scientific Monthly, 85 (1957) , 32. 
12 
conceptual framework. 13 
IV. 
Finally, the formalist school, like the logical school, is 
attempting to carry the ultimate foundation of mathematical knowledge 
further back than the postulational school. At the same time, they are 
trying to establish the consistency of all mathematics, and thus are 
attacking a problem which is not explicitly investigated by the logical 
school. Hilbert contends that the ultimate foundation for mathematics 
lies not in logic, but in certain pre-logical objects which are pre-
liminary conditions for logical thinking, and about which seem to be 
viewed with a definite intuitive knowledge. 
Certain mathematical statements, made by the use of symbols, are 
immediately capable of verification by the intuitive method, because of 
the inherent nature of the concepts represented by the symbols 3 + 1 
1 + 3. This statement is an example of a real proposition. 
On the other hand, certain other mathematical statements, like 
a + 1 = 1 + a where a represents any integer, are not verified in this 
way, because it is impossible to test all possible integers in the 
equation. To avoid the difficulty this equation must be thought of as 
a purely formal statement, and if it is to be verified at all it must 
be verified by formal argument without regard to the meaning of the 
statement. Statements of this second type are examples of ideal propo-
sitions, and the formal agruments necessary to establish them are to be 
made, according to definite rules, from previously listed axioms, with 
I 
13Niels Bohr, "Mathematics and Natural Philosophy,' ' Scientific 
Monthly, 82 (1956) , 86. 
reliance now merely on our intuitive knowledge of the characteristics 
of marks as marks. Examples of axioms are: 
1. A-+- ( B~ A) 
2. B ~ AVB 
3. A ~ A 
4. A= a 
5. a= b ~ A ( a ) ~ A (b ) 
6. a = o 
As the specific foundation for this formalized structure the 
formalist propose axioms which are the images of fundamental logical 
and mathematical ideas, concerned with implication and ordinary integers. 
By following formal rules which are so chosen as to coFrespond with 
accepted processes of deductive thinking theorems are deduced from the 
axioms. These again are images of corresponding theorems having thought 
content. New axioms are introduced as a basis for continuing the pro-
cess, provided at each state the consistency of the axioms is established. 
The method of proving consistency is also a special formula procedure 
baeed pn two of the original axioms. In other words, every proof should 
be so reconstructed as to make apparent a particular kind of formal 
structure which can be discovered by appropriate restatement of it. 14 
The purpose of the formalized procedure is not to make mathematics 
an arbitrary game with meaningless marks, but to render the logical 
structure of existing mathematics more secure by making it more defi-
nitely objective. This theory makes explicit the rules according to 
which thinking proceeds, and thereby provides a basis for objective 
thinking in all fields, as opposed to subjective opinion and emotion. 
14constantine Plitis, "Limitations of Formalization," Philosophy 
Science, 32 (1965 ) . 
14 
v. 
First, a general survey from the postulational standpoint, mathe-
matics is a collection of deductive sciences each having its own set of 
postulates and undefined terms, each making free use of logic in 
developing its own set of theorems; from the logical standpoint,. mathe-
matics is a unified science which can be developed out of logical con-
cepts from logical principles, and by use of logical principles; from 
the formalist standpoint, the formal structure o.f mathematics is to be 
developed from certain logical and mathematical axioms, considered as 
images of thought, by means of formal application of the rules of 
deduction. 
From all three standpoints, the method and structure of mathe-
matics may be called deductive, for, in each case, the program calls 
for assumptions and undefinej terms as a starting point for the use of 
deductive reasoning to arrive at new conclusions. In the postulational 
school there are different starting points for the various mathematical 
sciences, most of which assume deductive logic without analyzing it; in 
the logical school the starting point is carried down into the primitive 
ideas and propositions of logic, and logic is then developed in great 
detail, finally merging with mathematics; in the formalist school, the 
most fundamental level of the foundations goes still deeper, and con-
sists in our intuitive knowledge of pre-logical and pre-math symbols, 
while the next higher level consists of axioms both of mathematics and 
logic. 
It seems fair to say that any. judgement concerning the truth or 
consistency of the assumptions used in any of the three schools, depends 
in the last analysis, on intuitive, unproved notions. Any absolute 
15 
basis for claiming truth or consistency thus seems to be lacking. 
Therefore, certain general conclusions concerning the nature of 
mathematics, when viewed in the light of modern investigations, can be 
drawn. 
1. The subject matter of mathematics is not restricted to ideas 
of "number and space." From the modern point of veiw the 
subject matter may include logic, abstract sciences, and a 
wide range of concr·ete interpretations. The ultimate origin 
of the subject matter seems to be in intuitive ideas. 
2. A starting point consisting of assumptions and undefined 
terms is necessary for the development of any mathematical 
structure. No matter whether this starting ·point is 
explicitely formulated in logic, beyond logic, or prior to 
logic, any judgement concerning the truth of the assumptions 
seems to depend on intuitive considerations. 
3. The method by which a mathematical structure is developed is 
the method of deductive reasoning used in obtaining theorems 
from the fundamental assumptions, and the corresponding pro-
cess of defining new concepts with ultimate dependence on the 
original undefined concepts. 
4. The soundness of a mathematical structure of thought depends 
on the soundness of the deductive reasoning used in develop-
ing it, and on the consistency of the original assumptions. 
So far no absolute basis has been established for judging 
whether these requirements are met. 
5. The theorems of mathematics are not absolute truths. They 
are true at most in relation to the postulates from which 
they were deduced, and the methods of reasoning by which they 
were deduced. 
VI. 
The contrast of these conclusions with the traditional view of 
mathematics is striking but it is not safe to claim that a presentation 
of any final picture of the nature of mathematics has been made; for 
the fundamental concepts and methods of mathematics are perpetually in 
a state of evolution and conflict. 15 
15stabler, op. cit. 
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